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Abstract
Access control solutions for open systems are typically based on the assumption that a client may adopt
approached specically designed for the server to protect the disclosure of her sensitive information. These
solutions however do not consider the specic privacy requirements characterizing the client. In this paper, we
put forward the idea of adopting a dierent model at the client-side, aimed at minimizing the amount of sensitive
information released to a server. The model should be based on a formal modeling of the client portfolio and
should easily support the denition of privacy preferences and disclosure limitations for empowering the user in
the release of her personal information.
1 Introduction
The advancements in the Information Technology allow people to use and access resources and services on the
Web anywhere and anytime. Web-based service systems may then receive requests from dierent, remotely located,
parties that may be unknown. This aspect makes the traditional solutions for regulating access to resources and
services no more applicable since they are typically based on a preliminary identication and authentication of the
requesting client. The server providing a service or a resource has instead the need of identifying and communicating
the conditions under which access can be granted, and a client has the need of proving whether she is entitled to
get the access. In this context, credentials can be adopted as a convenient way for regulating interactions among
dierent unknown parties in open systems. A server can then give the client a list with all the possible sets of
credentials/properties that would enable the service, and the client can choose those credentials/properties that
satisfy the server request and at the same time is more convenient with respect to her privacy.
Many existing solutions (e.g., [4, 5, 11, 12, 16]) have proposed novel policy languages for enforcing credential-
based access control at the server side. These solutions typically assume that a symmetric approach can be adopted
at the client-side, where policies are used to regulate the release of the private information (credentials) of the
client. However, since these approaches are specically target for the server, they do not fully support the client's
requirements in term of privacy and data management. An attempt to consider the client's privacy requirements
is related to the specication of secondary use restrictions, that is, how the personal information can be managed
and possibly distributed after the client has released it to an external server. The Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P) [13] is a well-know XML-based language that addresses the secondary use aspect by allowing clients to assess
whether the privacy practices adopted by a server provider comply with her privacy preferences. P3P includes a
language and a mechanism for ensuring that clients can be informed about the privacy policies of the server. The
corresponding language that would allow clients to specify their preferences as a set of preference-rules is called
A P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL) [14]. A client however can neither specify the sensitivity of her
personal information nor select the \minimal pertinent information" that should be released to the server to gain
the access. Although recent proposals (e.g., [8, 10, 15]) have addressed these problems, they result still preliminary
since they provide a simplied and partial modeling of the client's personal information and lack of the exibility to
model and manage client's privacy requirements.
In this paper, we address the problem of developing a powerful, exible, and easy to use solution for specifying
privacy preferences to oer clients a more meaningful control over information released to a server. In particular,
we aim at developing a ne-grained solution that allows clients to specify their privacy preferences on each single
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Figure 1: An example of hierarchy of credential types
property and/or credential belonging to them and to take advantage from modern credential technologies (e.g., [1, 9])
to release to the server exactly the information needed to have access and nothing more, in full respect of clients'
privacy. This problem is without doubt complex and needs to be considered from dierent, complementary, and
synergistic point of views: usability, social, economic, and technological perspectives. In particular, the development
of user-friendly, intuitive user interfaces that enforce the privacy preferences plays an important role for the successful
application of the proposed solution. In the following, we focus on the technological aspect and put forward the idea
of developing a ne-grained model for the specication of privacy preferences [2, 3].
2 Modeling of the client portfolio
A key requirement for a framework empowering a client with full control over personal information released during
the interactions with a server is the denition of an expressive model representing such a personal information.
The model should enable the client to easily state her preferences on the disclosure of credentials/properties and
should take advantage from emerging credential technologies that support the selective release of properties within
credentials, as allowed by novel anonymous credentials (e.g., [1, 9]). In the following, we use the term portfolio to
refer to the set of certied properties (credentials) and uncertied properties (declarations) characterizing a client [5].
2.1 Abstractions over credential types
Each credential in the client portfolio is characterized by a unique identier, a set of certied properties, an issuer, and
a type. The type of a credential identies the properties that the credential certies. The declarations form a special
credential of type \declaration" whose issuer is the client itself. Since specifying privacy preferences on each single
property and/or credential may be cumbersome for a client, credential types can be organized in a hierarchy , whose
leaves represent the types of credentials in the client portfolio, and whose intermediate nodes represent abstractions
over them. In this way, a client can specify her privacy preferences in terms of credential abstractions, types, and
instances. Privacy preferences specied on abstractions and types are propagated down in the hierarchy following
the most specic principle. The root of the hierarchy, denoted , is an abstraction of any type of credential (including
declarations) in the client portfolio. Formally, a hierarchy H of credential types is a pair (T ,isa), where T is the set
of all credential types and abstractions over them, and isa is a partial order relationship over T . Given two types
t i and tj in T , t iisatj if tj is an abstraction of t i. Figure 1 illustrates a hierarchy of credential types where, for
example, id is an abstraction of credential types photo id and student id (i.e., photo idisaid and student idisaid).
The hierarchy of credential types represent the common knowledge shared between a client and a server. Since a
server has not any knowledge about the client portfolio, any request by the server for a set of (certied) properties
may only refer to credential types and abstractions in the hierarchy.
2.2 Atomic vs non-atomic credentials
The need for avoiding the disclosure of unnecessary personal information is an important requirement for a client to
preserve her privacy. Unfortunately, the most common kind of credentials used today in distributed systems (e.g.,
X.509 certicates) can only be released as a whole or not disclosed at all. This implies that the release of such
credentials, which we call atomic, entails the disclosure of all the properties they certify, thus making impossible
the disclosure of the minimal information needed for service access. Our model goes one step forward and takes
into consideration modern credential technologies (e.g., U-Prove, and Idemix [6, 7]) supporting the selective release
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Properties
Id Dep. Value
SSN 123-45-6789
Name Bob
Degree Master
Country USA
HomeNumber 789-231-044
WorkNumber 789-543-021
MobileNumber 779-523-134
NickName bob75
VISANum X 4353. . . 21
MCNum X 5643. . . 18
Credentials
Id Atom. Type Properties
Passport X photo id Name,Country
myUnivId student id Name,Degree
myVISA X credit card Name,VISANum
myMC X credit card Name,MCNum
decl declaration SSN,Name,Degree,Country,HomeNumber
WorkNumber,MobileNumber,NickName,VISANum,MCNum
Figure 2: An example of portfolio
of arbitrary subsets of properties within credentials. We refer to these credentials as non-atomic, since each client
can individually release properties within credentials, or the existence of the credential itself. The unique restriction
imposed by non-atomic credentials is that the release of a property within a credential also entails the release of
the existence of the credential certifying it. Clearly, declarations are non-atomic credentials, since they can be
individually released by the client when needed.
2.3 Credential-dependent vs credential-independent properties
Properties in the client portfolio can be associated uniquely with the client or can depend on the specic credential
certifying them. For instance, name is a property that can be certied by dierent credentials but its value depends
only on the owner of these credentials. A property representing a credit card number can instead be specic of
the credential certifying it. In the following, we use the terms credential-independent and credential-dependent to
refer to properties whose values depend only on the credential owner and on the specic credential certifying them,
respectively. The importance of distinguish these two classes of properties arise when a client has to dene her
privacy preferences. As a matter of fact, since credential-independent properties correspond to the same piece of
information, a client has to specify her privacy preference for such properties only once.
Example 2.1 Figure 2 illustrates an example of a portfolio, including properties SSN, Name, Degree, Country,
HomeNumber, WorkNumber, MobileNumber, and NickName, which are credential-independent, and VISANum and MCNum,
which are credential-dependent. The portfolio contains credentials Passport (of type photo id), myUnivId (of type
student id), myVISA and myMC (both of type credit card), and a declaration decl including all the properties in the
portfolio. The non-atomic credentials are myUnivId and decl.
3 Privacy preference requirements and specications
When accessing a service/resource, a client may need to release personal information according to a server request,
stating the information about which conditions need to be satised for the access to be granted. A client has then to
determine which properties/credentials disclose to gain access while also limiting the release of sensitive information
that is not strictly necessary. For instance, suppose that for accessing a specic service, a server requires the address
or the email of the requesting client. In this case, the client may prefer to release her address instead of her email
since she consider the email more sensitive than the address. Clearly, if there are several alternative options from
which the client can choose, the task of determining which properties/credentials release may become complex. A
simple, while eective and exible, solution to express privacy preferences on the release of properties/credentials
is then needed to: i) automatically regulate the disclosure of sensitive information upon server requests; and ii)
preserve the privacy of the client by providing a support for determining the minimal information that has to be
released to acquire a service.
An essential step for dening a solution for the specication of privacy preferences consists in identifying the main
requirements that it should satisfy. We now briey discuss such requirements in the following.
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 Fine-grained specication. The framework for privacy preference specications should allow clients to dene
their privacy preferences on each single property and credential in the portfolio, thus providing a ne-grained
control on their personal information. A privacy preference should reect how much a client values the disclosure
of a given personal information. For instance, a client should have the possibility to specify that her email is
more valuable than her address, meaning that if a server requests the email of the address for granting the
access to a service, the address is selected and released.
 Support for sensitive associations. There are cases where two or more elements in the portfolio should be
considered more (or less) sensitive when their values are associated than when either appears separately.
For instance, the association between user Name and her Degree can be considered more sensitive than the
properties singularly taken or the association between HomeNumber and Country carries less information than
the information carried by these two properties since from the area code reported in HomeNumber it is possible
to infer the country. A client may then need to specify how she values the association among dierent pieces
of information.
 Support for constraints on disclosure. There are also cases where the associations of the portfolio elements
should be forbidden since a client never wants to release some information in association or where some
limitations should be taken into consideration when disclosing personal information. For instance, a client may
want to protect the association between her Name and her NickName, meaning that the association between
these two properties should never be released, or may want to release only one among her telephone numbers.
A possible solution for expressing the requirements above consists in using sensitivity labels that reect how much
a client values the release of the credentials/properties in the portfolio. Clearly, our solution to be eective needs to
be also supported by user-friendly interfaces that allow a client to easily express her preferences.
3.1 Fine-grained specications
Each credential and property in the portfolio is associated with a sensitivity label  that belongs to an arbitrary
set  characterized by a partial order relationship  and a composition operator . The partial order relationship
allows a client to declare whether a property/credential should be considered more or less sensitive than another
property/credential. Intuitively, if an element is considered more sensitive than another element, the sensitivity label
of the rst will dominate the sensitivity label of the second. The sensitivity label associated with a property then
reects how much the user considers the property sensitive. For instance, if property SSN is considered more sensitive
than property Name, (SSN)  (Name). The sensitivity label associated with a credential reects the sensitivity of
the existence of the credential, independently from the properties it certies. For instance, the release of a dialysis
certicate including properties Name and Country, not only discloses demographical information, but also the fact
that the client has a specic health problem. The sensitivity associated with the disclosure of an atomic credential
corresponds therefore to the composition of the sensitivity labels of all properties certied by the credential and the
sensitivity label of the existence of the credential itself. For non-atomic credentials, their disclosure may be evaluated
by considering only the existence if this is the unique information released about them.
Note that our general denition of sensitivity label permits to use dierent approaches to dene such labels. For
instance, sensitivity labels could be classical multilevel security classications (e.g., Top Secret, Secret, Condential,
Unclassied, possibly with associated categories) with the  operator corresponding to the least upper bound . Also,
they could be positive integer values, where the  operator can be either the sum (i.e., ij = i+j) and therefore
reecting an additive property , the maximum (i.e., ij=max (i; j)), or the minimum (i.e., ij=min(i; j)).
3.2 Associations and constraints
The sensitivity label for the combined release of a set of properties and/or credentials is naturally obtained by
composing (operator ) their sensitivity labels. The cases where the release of some elements of the portfolio do
not simply correspond to the composition of their sensitivity labels (it could be either higher or lower) can be easily
modeled allowing a client to express how much she values the association. The sensitivity label of the association must
then be considered when composing the sensitivity labels of the involved elements. We also aim at easily supporting
constraints on the disclosure of properties and credentials. In particular, the following types of associations and
constraints may need to be considered.
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Properties
(SSN) : 20 (WorkNumber) : 8
(Name) : 1 (MobileNumber) : 12
(Degree) : 5 (NickName) : 1
(Country) : 2 (VISANum) : 10
(HomeNumber): 4 (MCNum) : 15
Credentials
(Passport) : 4
(myUnivId) : 6
(myVISA) : 3
(myMC ) : 8
(decl) : 0
Sensitive views
(fName; Degreeg) : 5
Dependencies
(fHomeNumber; Countryg) : -2
Forbidden views
fName,NickNameg
Disclosure limitations
fHomeNumber,WorkNumber,MobileNumberg1
Figure 3: Portfolio sensitivity specications
 Sensitive views ( > 0) model situations where the combined release of a set of properties and/or credentials
carries more information than the composition of the sensitivity labels of its elements. For instance, sensitivity
label (fName; Degreeg) represents the additional sensitivity due to the association between properties Name
and Degree.
 Dependencies ( < 0) model situations where the combined release of a set of properties and/or credentials
carries less information than the composition of the sensitivity labels of its elements. For instance, sensitivity
label (fHomeNumber; Countryg) represents the sensitivity label to be removed due to the fact that the area
code in the phone number carries information about the country, meaning that the combined release of Country
together with HomeNumber does not release additional information with respect to the release of HomeNumber
only. Note that, in general, the sensitivity of an association can take any value, provided that disclosing several
elements in association overall has a sensitivity which is at least the one of the most sensitive element.
 Forbidden views model situations where some portfolio elements cannot be jointly released; any proper subset
of a forbidden view can instead be disclosed. For instance, properties Name and NickName have each a sensitivity
label that has to be considered when each property is released, but their association should never be disclosed.
 Disclosure limitations model situations where a client may need to enforce a limitation of the kind at most n of
these elements can be jointly released. For instance, a user may specify that at most one among HomeNumber,
WorkNumber, or MobileNumber, can be released.1
Example 3.1 Figure 3 illustrates an example of sensitivity labels for properties and credentials in the port-
folio illustrated in Figure 2. For simplicity, in the example, we use integer numeric values as sensitiv-
ity labels, composed through the sum operator. The gure also reports one sensitive view fName, Degreeg;
one dependency fHomeNumber, Countryg; one forbidden view fName,NickNameg; and one disclosure limitation
fHomeNumber,WorkNumber,MobileNumberg1, where the subscript 1 states that at most 1 among the properties com-
posing the constraint can be released.
Note that a client may also need to specify dierent preferences for dierent servers. For instance, a client may
be willing to release her credit card information to her bank to perform a payment, but she may not want to release
her dialysis certicate. By contrast, she may be interested to disclose to a hospital her dialysis certicate to reserve
an exam, but she may not want to release her credit card information. If the client needs to express dierent privacy
requirements for dierent servers, she may assign multiple labels to each component in her portfolio, one for each
server.
The privacy preferences expressed through sensitivity labels associated with properties, credentials, and associ-
ations along with the disclosure constraints support the automatic selection of the information to be released to a
server. Intuitively, given a server request expressed in terms of properties and/or credentials that a requesting client
1Note that forbidden view constraints can be seen as a specic kind of disclosure limitation constraints, specifying that at most n  1
among n portfolio elements can be released.
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can release, the client determines set of properties/credentials whose release satises the service request and, at the
same time, the corresponding sensitivity is minimized. The sensitivity of a release is obtained by composing all
the sensitivity labels of the disclosed elements, of the exposed sensitive views, and of the released dependencies. In
addition, the release to be considered acceptable from the client must not violate any disclosure constraint.
4 Conclusions
We illustrated the main privacy requirements of a client, interacting with a server, to acquire a service online. The
denition of sensitivity labels for the properties, credentials, and associations, together with the specication of
disclosure constraints, permit a client to express her privacy preferences in an eective and exible way. A client can
then identify the subset of her portfolio that better satises the server request, minimizing the amount of disclosed
sensitive information.
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